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 Abstract 
Nineteenth-century British politics cultivated the idea that it was Britain’s 
responsibility to enforce its virtues upon the rest of the world. Domestic and foreign 
issues became linked by fundamental themes as new forces of liberalism, political 
reform and religious pluralism challenged the old English regime. The Belgian Revolt, 
and its diplomatic and political aftermath, had a tremendous impact on the ideological 
struggle in Parliament. The opinion and interest for the Belgian case and the 
appropriate British response to it led to many intense parliamentary debates in the 
years 1830-1834. Furthermore, the Belgian question influenced discussions on other 
significant issues in British politics, such as parliamentary reform, repeal of the union 
with Ireland, collaboration with the Concert of Europe, France and the Holy Alliance. 
As foreign policy and domestic affairs became integrated through fundamental themes, 
an ideological struggle erupted and political parties presented themselves as more 
patriotic than their rivals. Consequently, the Belgian question became the battleground 
on which English intellectual, cultural and moral ideas were projected.   
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Introduction 
In the shadow of history irony always lurks. On 12 June 2015 Belgium celebrated the 
200th Birthday of the Battle of Waterloo. Many have observed that the divided country 
seized the celebrations to promote national unity within the country as a kind of nation 
building.1 The Battle initiated a period that can defined by the creation of modern 
nation states and nationalism. It stood at the beginning of a chain of events that 
eventually resulted in Belgian unity and independence. The Belgian nation state came 
into existence after several conferences of the Concert of Europe (Concert), also 
known as the Congress System. The Austrian Empire, France, Great Britain, Prussia 
and the Russia Empire were united in the Concert. They met on a regular basis in 
London to address the unrest in the southern provinces of the United Kingdom of the 
Netherlands after the outbreak of the Belgian Revolt in August 1830. The kingdom 
was a melting pot of different cultures, economies, religions and languages. King 
William I (1772-1843) aspired to unite the Northern Netherlands with the southern 
provinces but he was met with fierce civil opposition in the south.2 The Concert felt a 
responsibility to take care of the settlement of the Belgian Revolt since the Dutch 
kingdom had been a creation by the four great European powers at the Congress of 
Vienna in 1814-1815. It was a carefully construed plan to create a buffer state in order 
to contain France and bring stability to the European mainland.3 Furthermore, 
revolutions were severely condemned by the Concert’s conservative members, 
Austria, Prussia and Russia, who were united in the Holy Alliance. They feared 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Piet van Asseldonk, ‘Pikante rol Willem-Alexander bij herdenking Waterloo’, 
[http://nos.nl/artikel/2040978-pikante-rol-willem-alexander-bij-herdenking-waterloo.html] (accessed on: 12 
June). 
2 J.S. Fishman, Diplomacy and revolution. The London Conference of 1830 and the Belgian Revolt 
(Amsterdam 1988) 25-6. 
3 Rolf Falter, 1830: De Scheiding van Nederland, België en Luxemburg (Lannoo 2005) 19. 
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revolution would spread across the continent as the July Revolution in France had 
already shaken up the European continent that year.4  
 
 The aim of this thesis is to show that the Belgian Revolt, and its diplomatic and 
political aftermath, had a tremendous impact on the British ideological struggle in 
Parliament, in the years 1830-1834. According to historian Jonathan Parry, European 
problems made patriotism a major political issue because not only the British 
governments’ ability to promote British affairs and interests abroad lay under scrutiny, 
but also the representation of English political values at home and on the international 
stage.5 In his book The Politics of Patriotism English Liberalism, national identity and 
Europe, 1830-1886, Parry demonstrates that  ‘domestic, foreign, imperial and Irish 
issues all involved similar underlying themes – of the responsibility of political leaders 
and the political nation to forge a strong and beneficent national community on 
healthy principles.’6  
 It is relevant to consider the settlement of the Belgian question in the broader 
debate on the development of patriotism and English identity, because it is overlooked 
in Parry’s work. This paper will argue that the settlement of the Belgian question is 
very relevant to the ideological struggle among the political parties and that this 
struggle erupts earlier than Parry argues. This is demonstrated by the frequent and 
intense parliamentary debates on the Belgian Revolt and the subsequent negotiations. 
It is also demonstrated in the specific time period of 1830-1834. This period entails 
two different governments that adhered to very different political philosophies, namely 
the Tory Wellington and Whig Grey governments. The period of 1830-1834 is also of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Fishman, Diplomacy and revolution, 19, 41. 
5 Lord Aberdeen, HPD3 15:104, 5 Feb. 1833. 
6 Jonathan Parry, The Politics of Patriotism. English Liberalism, national identity and Europe, 1830-
1886 (Cambridge 2006) 2. 
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interest to the British ideological struggle because all the political parties were 
confronted with internal dissonance due to developments and changes in British 
society.   
 The opinion and interest for the Belgian case and the appropriate British 
response to it led to many heated debates in both Houses of Parliament. Furthermore, 
the Belgian question influenced other momentous issues in Parliament. In debates on 
foreign policy, comparisons were often made between Belgium and other international 
crises. Belgium became either the example for the way the British government should 
respond internationally, or rather the lesson learned how not to act in domestic and 
foreign affairs. Debates on the settlement led to questioning geopolitical structures and 
mechanisms, and England’s place therein. What is even more interesting is that the 
Belgian Revolt and the subsequent negotiations were used as precedents, for context 
or for comparison in parliamentary debates on domestic issues. Many times the 
Belgian question is introduced unexpectedly as parliamentarians utilise it to reinforce 
their arguments on domestic policy. The Belgian Revolt also led to questioning the 
means of revolution in general and these discussions in particular were conducted in 
patriotic language.  
    The parliamentary debates will be the dominant source for this thesis. As the 
focus will be on language and rhetoric quotes are used to engage the reader in actual 
speeches. To avoid not seeing the wood for the trees the thesis is structured around 
certain themes that are often discussed in relation to the Belgium question. These 
themes reflect both issues of domestic and foreign policy. A short introduction of the 
events and context precedes the chapters on the actual parliamentary debates. 
	   7	  
Throughout the paper, British and English are used interchangeably and England is 
used to mean the British state and nation.7
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Parry, The Politics of Patriotism, 13, 38. 
	   8	  
Chapter 1 – British politics in 1820-1830s 
It is often said that the revolutions of the eighteenth-century led to the birth of political 
ideology, resulting in the politicisation of society as a whole.1 Britain changed 
immensely during the last two decades of the eighteenth-century and the political 
landscape transformed in the years 1827-1832.2 The end of Britain’s ancien régime 
came sudden as Anglican privileges were legislated away in 1828, the Protestant 
privileges were removed in 1829, and finally the Great Reform Act dismantled the 
influence and power of the monarch and the House of Lords in 1832.3 New forces of 
liberalism, political reform and religious pluralism challenged the old patriarchal 
regime. As the ancien régime felt threatened, a neo-conservative ideology developed as 
a reaction against the progressive ideologies associated with recent revolutions.4 
According to historian Boyd Hilton (1944) ‘political, religious, and intellectual disputes 
cut much more deeply after 1783, as the English became locked in ‘a war of ideas’.5  
  
 1.1 Domestic issues  
Three parties ruled British politics. The Tories, a conservative party, had a strong 
attachment to traditional institutions and adhered to Protestant ideals. They tried to 
portray themselves as a patriotic party. The Whig party considered themselves as the 
true advocates of the historic English constitution and defenders of popular liberties.6 
They often accused the Tories of ignoring liberalising trends in Europe because they 
were unwilling to support effective liberal policies abroad.7 The Radicals were strong 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Hilton, Mad, Bad, and Dangerous People? England 1783-1846 (Oxford 2006) 31. 
2 Hilton, Mad, Bad, and Dangerous People? 24. 
3 Ibid., 24. 
4 Ibid., 25, 30. 
5 Ibid., 30. 
6 Parry, The Politics of Patriotism,10. 
7 Ibid., 11. 
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supporters of parliamentary reform and Catholic emancipation. They objected to Grey’s 
Whig government on grounds of class and religion.8 
 In the first half of the nineteenth-century the parties were internally divided. The 
Tories were particularly divided on social and economic issues, in liberal and high or 
ultra-Tories, but most differences were related to emphasis rather than substance.9 They 
had different notions on the role of the government. Both favoured delegating authority 
to local officials and they agreed that the central government had certain core tasks like 
law and order, diplomacy and defence. The ultra-Tories believed that the government 
needed constant monitoring and managing, whereas the liberal Tories wanted the state 
to operate neutrally. The division in the Tory party was especially strong during the late 
1820s and 1830s as liberal views were increasingly used in a positive sense in 1827.10  
 
 The year 1830 was characterised by demands for reform and these calls penetrated 
all areas of institutional life as everything became political.11 The effects of an ever-
increasing industrialisation and urbanisation caused a polarisation of values between the 
landed interest and the rest. As political unions emerged in 1830, the issue of 
parliamentary reform slowly began to stir. The issue had seemed dead but was 
unexpectedly revived as a consequence of the fall of the Wellington government.12 The 
prime minister, the Duke of Wellington (r. 1828-1830), had announced opposition to 
reform and it resulted in a divergence over reform across Britain. The Whigs gained 
national popularity as they supported reform and the Grey government (r.1830-1834) 
passed the Reform Bill in June 1832.13 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Ibid., 12. 
9 Hilton, Mad, Bad, and Dangerous People? 315. 
10 Ibid., 315-6, 375. 
11 Ibid., 32. 
12 Ibid., 411. 
13 Ibid., 419-1.	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 Another important topic in domestic affairs concerned Ireland. A decade of turmoil 
had dominated Ireland when the British government decided to dissolve the Dublin 
Parliament in 1800-1 and ceded legislative sovereignty to Westminster.14 The following 
decades British politics was concentrated on making the union with Ireland work while 
it was constantly confronted with fear for disorder, instability and revolution.15  
 1.2 British foreign policy  
British politicians believed it was Britain’s destiny to play a strong role on the 
international stage. They felt it was their responsibility to secure an influential position 
for Britain in international, especially European, politics. Whatever the particularities of 
an issue abroad, it always came down to Britain’s standing opposite powerful rivals. 
Discussions on British domestic policies were linked to foreign affairs by patriotic 
themes.16 As British politicians projected an image of a Britain that represented 
constitutionalism, humanitarianism and rule of law, they believed the British political 
community provided a counterweight to threatening autocratic regimes on the 
continent.17 
 Nineteenth-century British politicians considered many European powers rivals, 
especially France and Russia. Consequently, British society was often mirrored to 
regimes across the channel. The formation of the British national identity was strongly 
influenced by the opposition between Britain and continental Europe. The continent was 
narrowed down to France as the stereotypical continental state. A popular image of the 
continent consisted of notions of authoritarian Catholic regimes and a poor and ignorant 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Ibid., 31. 
15 Ibid., 31. 
16 Parry, The Politics of Patriotism, 2, 5-6. 
17 Ibid., 3. 
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population, while Britain was linked to political freedom, Protestantism, 
constitutionalism, rationalism, enlightenment, prosperity and overall superiority.18  
 The general aim of British foreign policy was to consolidate national power by 
promoting equilibrium and peace abroad, and by maintaining restraint during 
international crises.19 The Congress System provided a stage on which Britain could 
project its values and consolidate its influence. Justification for British foreign politics 
became increasingly cloaked in constitutional and humanitarian rhetoric. British 
politicians began to cultivate the idea of Britain’s responsibility to enforce its virtues of 
constitutionalism, peaceful relations and free trade upon the rest of the world. At the 
same time they wanted to avoid war and refrain from entering into continental 
commitments in order to maintain room to manoeuvre and uphold a balance of power.20 
The spread of British commerce would set in motion a process of cultivating English 
constitutional liberalism abroad. In this manner, liberal policy united domestic and 
foreign policy and it acted as a powerful tool to strengthen political power at home. 
During interventions on the European mainland, the British government would often 
justify the interference as a means to install superior, English, political values in 
countries suffering under the burden of reactionary forces.21  
 
 1.3 Patriotism and nationality in British politics 
One of the major themes in nineteenth-century British elite politics ‘was the image of 
itself that Britain should project – whether on the diplomatic stage, in its self-
presentation vis-à-vis the continental powers, or in internal affairs.’22 British politicians 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Pieter François, ‘Belgium – country of liberals, Protestants and the free: British views on Belgium in the mid 
nineteenth century’, Historical Research 81 214 (November 2008) 669. 
19 Parry, The Politics of Patriotism, 6. 
20 Ibid., 6. 
21 Ibid., 6-9. 
22 Ibid.,1-2. 
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used international politics as a stage on which their foreign policy could act as a means 
to exhibit British superiority concerning constitutional and ethical values. Ideological 
terms were used to stigmatise certain foreign issues as ‘un-English’.23 Political debates 
on foreign affairs became governed by discussions on the values and purposes British 
politicians should profess in general. The nineteenth-century historiographical debate 
has considered British foreign policy separate from the main domestic issues due to 
their specialist nature and the conviction that foreign policy was never a preeminent 
electoral issue. However, members of Parliament raised general issues of foreign policy 
that had implications on domestic policy.24  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Ibid., 4. 
24 Ibid., 2, 4. 
	   13	  
Chapter 2 – The Belgian question in Parliament 
The king’s speech on opening the session in November 1830 ushered in a period, 
covering several years, in which the settlement of the Belgian question would regularly 
lead to heated parliamentary debates. At the outbreak of the Belgian Revolt, British 
politicians were aware of the responsibility Britain held towards the Dutch Kingdom as 
its existence and form was a predominantly British idea.  
             The British government considered the parliamentary questions and discussion 
relating to the Belgian question as a threat to the success of the negotiations. Foreign 
Minister Lord Palmerston (r. 1830-1834) spoke in patriotic terms as he condemned the 
inquiries during ‘negotiations of the greatest importance, not only to this country, but to 
all Europe,’ as having a paralysing effect on the prerogatives, namely of making war and 
peace, of the Crown and indirectly his advisers.1 However, former home secretary and 
Tory Robert Peel (r. 1828-1830) felt that ‘in the whole of the annals of England never 
was there a case which so imperiously demanded explanation—never was there a series 
of transactions on which, at a period when the members of his Majesty's Government 
should be released from the obligations of secrecy…’2 Particularly, Peel continued  
‘at a moment when the king of France had declared…that the tricoloured 
flag was floating on the walls of Lisbon—at a moment when the French 
army was occupying the fortresses in the Netherlands—at a moment when, 
according to appearances, the only signs of military activity on the part of 
the British Government were directed against its two most ancient allies, 
Portugal and Holland,—did the hon. Member think, that such was the 
moment at which men who were anxious for the interests, and still more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Lord Palmerston, HPD3 6:246, 18 Aug. 1831. 
2 Robert Peel, HPD3 6:258-9, 18 Aug. 1831.	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anxious for the honour, of England, were to be precluded from seeking 
information from his Majesty's Government?’3 
In the years 1830-1834 the government’s policies regarding the settlement of the Belgian 
question lay under continuous scrutiny of Parliament. It was a highly debated topic in 
both Houses and it also influenced discussions on domestic issues. In the parliamentary 
debates concerning the Belgian question was regularly put forward by the parties and 
used to reinforce their arguments, either relating to foreign or domestic affairs.  
 The aim of this chapter is to show that the Belgian question made patriotism a 
political issue and underlying theme in British foreign policy in 1830. It will try to 
illustrate how political parties used the question to project their interpretation of English 
political values in general. Several themes can be identified in de debates on Belgium that 
were controversial. To the parties, it all came down to the appropriate English reaction to 
the Concert, the Vienna treaties, the principle of non-interference, British collaboration 
with France and with the Holy Alliance.  
 
 2.1 The Concert of Europe and the balance of power 
The British involvement in the Concert had always been met with criticism and British 
foreign policy towards it had changed over the years. In November 1830 the Tories were 
the only party that believed in the power of collaboration within the Congress System in 
order to settle the Belgian question.4 Members of the conservative party believed that the 
Concert offered a balance of power that not solely meant any equality of power or of 
territory, but especially an equality of rights in the European political society. Above all, 
the equilibrium protected weaker against ‘the encroaching ambition of powerful States’.5 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Peel, HPD3 6:259, 18 Aug. 1831. 
4 Lord Grimstone, HPD3 1:56, 2 Nov. 1830. 
5 Colonel Evans, HPD3 6:102-3, 16 Aug. 1831. 
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The 3rd Marquis of Londonderry (1778-1854), known as a hard-line Tory and former 
Foreign Minister Lord Castlereagh’s (r.1812-1822) stepbrother, considered the 
preservation of the Concert as the ultimate way to bid defiance against international 
mischief.6 So he defended the current government’s recourse to the Concert. In light of 
the ‘patriotic deeds’ of his late stepbrother he shared his admiration of the way in which 
Lord Castlereagh enabled England to influence and control the other powers of the 
continent. As a result of Castlereagh’s efforts at Vienna, he had given ‘his country a fair 
and honourable, - a courteous and considerate, - a spirited and courageous standing 
amongst the other nations of the world… and our then high and elevated position.’7 
However, when the Whigs came to power Londonderry felt that the Grey Ministry had 
given away England’s high position as he described the ‘deplorable condition in which 
our foreign relations throughout Europe are now placed, and especially at this crisis, as 
relating to our recent transactions in Belgium.’8 Londonderry still believed that England’s 
fate in international politics could be turned and he advised the Whig government  
‘to take up a higher tone than that which they have hitherto used in these 
negotiations. I can assure them, that if they do assume such a tone, they 
will find Austria, Prussia and Russia, ready to chime in with it. At present, 
those Powers dare not assume that tone, whilst the French are allowed to 
domineer, as they recently have domineered, in the Conferences.’9 
The Radical party had been sceptical towards the Concert from its very beginning, they 
referred to it as ‘…a system which had been condemned by all good men, from its first 
establishment, as founded for the express purpose of putting down liberty and supporting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Marquis of Londonderry, HPD3 1:248, 8 Nov. 1830. 
7 Londonderry, HPD3 5:969, 9 Aug. 1831. 
8 Londonderry, HPD3 5:970, 9 Aug. 1831. 
9 Londonderry, HPD3 5:991, 9 Aug. 1831. 
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despotism all over Europe.’10 The Radicals did not understand how the English 
government could cooperate with ‘the despots of Europe’, who worked to ‘stifle liberty, 
even in the cradle’, according to Radical parliamentarian Joseph Hume (1777-1855).11  
 Throughout the settlement of the Belgian question the Grey government justified 
its participation in the Congress System by expressing that it was the best way to preserve 
both peace on the continent and the honour of Britain.12 Despite the fact that the course 
taken by the current government was initiated by their predecessors, the prime minister 
recounted that ‘there was no other safe path for the Government to follow, save that in 
which it had fortunately walked.’13 At first, when the Tories were still in power, the 
Whigs were not in favour of the king’s plan to settle the issue in concert with its allies. 
The Whigs, opposing absolute rule and supporting constitutional monarchism, regarded 
the Concert as ‘a gathering together of Kings’ which ‘must always be viewed with terror 
and alarm.’14 They asserted that authority to decide on the Belgian fate was not with the 
Congress. However, when the Whigs led the government they changed their tune as 
British cooperation with the Concert was continued.  
 The collaboration was increasingly criticised by both the Tories and the Radicals 
because they felt that it had pushed the English government to abandon the Dutch king 
and his people. Former Foreign Secretary the Earl of Aberdeen (r. 1828-Nov. 1830) 
lamented the change of course in British foreign policy, as the strict alliance with Holland 
was broken. He described how over time foreigners considered the core value of British 
foreign policy its loyalty to its allies.15 Aberdeen denounced the current government as 
they tarnished England’s standing by treating an ancient ally with neglect and being 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Joseph Hume, HPD3 1:78 2 Nov. 1830. 
11 Hume, HPD3 1:80 2 Nov. 1830. 
12 Earl Grey, HPD3 9:873, 26 Jan. 1832. 
13 Grey, HPD3 9:863-866, 26 Jan. 1832; 
 Grey, HPD3 9:873, 26 Jan. 1832 
14 Lord Brougham, HPD3 1:112, 2 Nov. 1830. 
15 Aberdeen, HPD3 5:1016-7, 9 Aug. 1831. 
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‘guilty of an abandonment of principle, in violation of solemn treaties and 
engagements.’16 The neglect was even more corrupt, according to Aberdeen, since the 
Dutch king had acted throughout the whole of the negotiations ‘with the utmost degree of 
fairness, candour, and good faith.’17  He spoke in the firmest words of patriotism ‘When 
he saw all sympathy withdrawn from one of the most ancient Allies of this country, and 
every means taken to promote the success of the unconstitutional encroachments of a 
Revolutionary State, he could not, however, avoid expressing his opinion, that the 
Government was pursuing a course unjust, impolitic, unstatesmanlike, and un-English.’18 
The English ministers, Aberdeen continued, should have shown more respect and 
consideration towards the king’s ‘firmness and patriotism’.19 The so-called neglect of an 
ancient ally was all the more poignant for England, according to the Tories, because  ‘the 
House of Orange, a House to which not only England, but Europe, indeed, the world at 
large, was more indebted for its services on the score of religious and civil liberty, than 
any other in existence.’20  
 To make matters even worse for British reputation on the international stage, the 
Tories believed that the rest of Europe judged Britain as ‘crouching to France, —that we 
were yielding up our allies to their enemies, and that we were alone occupied at home in 
attempting to revolutionize our own country.’21	  The Tories’ criticism was rebutted by the 
government as being unpatriotic as their accusations were leading England straight into a 
revolutionary war on the continent: ‘And was there an honest man—was there an 
Englishman who considered the consequences of such a war, who did not feel, that 
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everything ought to be done to prevent a cannon being fired in Europe?’22 The Tories 
were openly accused of using strong and dangerous language in order to provoke the 
ministers and to distract attention from domestic issues they resented, such as 
parliamentary reform.23 The accusations only invigorated the patriotic language used by 
the Tories to denunciate the government’s foreign policy:  
‘In the days of Lord Chatham [William Pitt (1708-1778) former prime 
minister (r.1766-1768)] England was respected by all the nations of 
Europe, but in these days she had abandoned all her ancient principles, and 
ought to blush at the name of Chatham—she had abandoned her old and 
faithful allies, rushing forward to grapple with the weak, and perfectly 
ready to truckle to the strong. If this system were continued, the English 
name would be a by-word for all that was base and dishonourable.’24 
The Radicals also accused the government of abandoning an old ally. However, they felt 
much sympathy for the Belgian case. ‘Did not the House see, that the ill-treated but 
glorious Belgians had been parcelled, out like so many pigs to a purchaser, in a manner 
disgraceful to Europe, but especially disgraceful to England, that had suffered such a 
parcelling?’25 The conservative politicians were not susceptible to the Radicals’ 
compassion for Belgium. They disapproved of the Belgians for taking recourse to 
violence and war. In particular considering that the Belgians themselves had suffered so 
much from the horrors of war and being conscious of its history as the arena ‘on which 
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the great Powers of Europe decided their quarrels’, they still decided not to address their 
grievances in a more reasonable way.26  
   The criticisms on England’s participation in the Concert never left the table. 
Aberdeen complained repeatedly about the hypocrisy of the Whig ministers. The same 
ministers had constantly objected to Congresses when they were not in power, while they 
now rendered the Concert indispensable for the negotiations and eventual execution of 
the final terms of settlement.27 But the ministers were not only self-contradictory 
regarding the role of the Concert, they had also not committed to their policy of active 
mediation as Holland was left out of the settling of the final terms of agreement, ‘a power 
whom you have ever, hitherto, found to be worthy of respect, and between whom and 
other foreign powers you have always understood an honourable connexion to have 
subsisted.’28  
 2.2 The Vienna treaties  
The 1815 peace agreement was fundamentally undermined when the Netherlands lost half 
of its territory and two-thirds of its population after the Belgian Revolt. In 1830, the king’s 
speech emphasised the necessity of respecting the Low Countries’ sovereignty in dealing 
with its internal affairs. At the same time it held the conviction that the arrangements of the 
Vienna treaties should be preserved because they offered the best security to maintain 
stability in the world.29 Earl Grey was soon to react as he denied the existence, ever, of 
unity in the United Kingdom of the Netherlands. ‘We have here an instance of two nations, 
possessing no natural attraction, but rather a very great repulsion, to each other, pounded 
together in the great mortar of the chemists of Vienna’.30 Above all, he felt ashamed that 	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the two were ever united at the Congress of Vienna and that foreigners considered the 
kingdom ‘as raised out of deference to England, at the special demand of Lord 
Castlereagh!’31 He did not see how Britain was to be involved in the settlement of the 
Belgian question because he believed that Britain was not bound by the Vienna treaties to 
do so. Above all, he argued that those treaties had not contributed to the tranquillity on the 
continent, and thus will not restore peace if applied to the current unrest in the Netherlands. 
He strongly advocated the principle of non-interference in a state’s internal affairs.32  
 Ultra-Tory Richard Vyvyan (1800-1879) believed that the Congress System was doomed 
to fail because it could only serve the balance of power that existed before 1789. Not only 
the system failed, the agreements in the Vienna treaties were also not fit to meet the 
challenges of a post-1789 Europe.33 Wellington, prime minister at that time, was of the 
opinion that the treaties had rather secured a period of longest, uninterrupted peace in 
Europe. This showed ‘that by common conciliation and management, the country would 
get over the present difficulties as it had got over others; and the course necessary to 
pursue was, to make the general interests of the different Powers of Europe compatible 
with the good government and welfare of their people.’34 And this was exactly the policy 
of the Wellington Ministry in the negotiations on the Belgian question. The separation of 
Holland and Belgium became an unavoidable reality to most politicians and particularly 
the government. 
 The Radicals did not believe that the treaties pacified Europe because the treaties had 
already proven to have exactly the opposite effect of pacification. Thus the continued 
adherence to the treaties by the Wellington Cabinet was not viable:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31 Grey, HPD3 1:41-2, 2 Nov. 1830. 
32 Grey, HPD3 1:39, 2 Nov. 1830. 
33 Vyvyan, HPD3 6:231, 18 Aug. 1831. 
34 Wellington, HPD3 1:49, 2 Nov. 1830. 
	   21	  
‘It was for the House, on behalf of the people of England, to tell the 
Ministers that it would not concur in supporting those treaties. Was it not 
time for the House to hesitate, to doubt that policy which might formerly 
have appeared wisdom, but which was now proved not to be so?’35 
Whig Earl Grey had always been critical towards the Vienna treaties. Even as prime 
minister he expressed his contempt: ‘for in the treaties concluded by the noble Duke 
[Wellington], which had for their object the settlement of Europe, were laid the seeds of 
those distractions and changes which had taken place every year since they were concluded, 
and which were still going on.’36 The Marquis of Londonderry wanted to remind the House 
of the enthusiasm with which the treaties were received at the time:  
‘I beg the Noble Earl [Grey] to contrast his own opinion with what was the 
general opinion of the British Nation, and of the British House of 
Commons at the period in question… I remember well the proud day, 
when, on his [Lord Castlereagh] return from abroad, the negotiator of 
these treaties was received with the general acclamations of a British 
House of Commons, and when men of all parties, and, without one 
individual exception, Tories, Whigs, and Canningites, stood up to receive 
him, and gave him that enthusiastic and long-continued cheering which his 
great and successful labours had so well earned.’37 
 2.3 Principle of non-interference 
The principle of non-interference had always been a matter of contention in British foreign 
policy. Consequently, it became a dominant topic in the debates on British involvement in 
the settlement of the Belgian question. British politicians approved of intervention 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Hume, HPD3 1:82, 2 Nov. 1830. 
36 Hume, HPD3 4:307, 24 Jun. 1831. 
37 Londonderry, HPD3 5:972, 9 Aug. 1831. 
	   22	  
depending on whether it was in line with liberal patriotic ideas. However, non-
interventionism was a long-standing tendency in Britain’s old diplomatic system and it was 
in line with Britain’s objectives of maintaining peace abroad and avoiding continental 
entanglements. On top of that, Britain did not have the aspiration to acquire territory on the 
European mainland, thus it did not need to take action under the guise of intervention.38 The 
principle was particularly popular in British politics after the Congress of Vienna. Mainly 
because many liberal politicians believed that Britain did not need recourse to war in order 
to impose its strong and progressive values. However, efforts by the great powers to 
suppress national and liberal movements across the continent were considered as hostile, 
particularly by Radical politicians.39 In addition, the inherency of patriotism in British 
politics made the principle of intervention necessary to put force to the patriotic claim 
abroad. Above all, there had always been the idea that Britain should cooperate with other 
powers for the preservation of honourable peace and stability.40  
 The Earl Grey considered the principle of non-interference every country’s duty and he 
reacted surprised by the allusion in the king’s speech that the side of the Dutch government 
had been chosen. He felt that in this way the principle was thrown out of the window since 
the Belgians were condemned as revolted subjects against an enlightened government.41 As 
a reaction the Wellington Ministry defended the king’s speech and its own behaviour as 
acting as a mediator between the Netherlands and Belgium. Grey still considered the 
expressions in the king’s speech as unjust and impolitic. He could not see how England 
could act as a mediator because the government had already publicly chosen sides. The 
prime minister defended the king’s support for the Dutch king as the Belgian Revolt was 
directed at King William’s legal and established government. Above all, Britain and the 	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Netherlands had been close and near allies.42  
 The Radicals were the most ardent antagonists of intervention. Hume even went so far as 
to pronounce that  
‘all men who were friends of freedom- all who felt for the true interests of 
this country, would deeply regret such an interference. Every man who 
loved liberty admired the Belgians for turning out the Dutch, who had 
acted in such an infamous manner.’43  
They were surprised that Britain adhered to the principle of non-interference in Portugal but 
not for Belgium, they wondered out loud how these two choices of conduct could be 
harmonised:  
‘they could not be reconciled; and such conduct, instead of adding to the 
character of England, would heap disgrace upon it. It would be a disgrace to 
England to boast of her own liberty, and yet force slavery on other 
nations.’44  
Home Secretary Peel defended the interference by making the observation that there existed 
a wide distinction between the affairs in the Netherlands, as well as between the causes of 
the events which had taken place in the two countries.45 He insisted that  
‘the Belgian provinces had always been the ground on which the great 
conflicts of Europe had been determined. For this reason, the condition of 
these Provinces had always been a subject of deep interest to every State in 
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Europe, and especially to England,—not with regard to the form of 
government, but with respect to their tranquillity.’46  
On top of that the minister stated that the Treaty of 1814 authorised interference through 
mediation, it was a right possessed by all parties to that treaty.47 However, this argument 
was undermined in the House of Lords in which a Whig  
‘could not find in the whole of it the shadow of a shade of anything which 
could impose on us the duty of interfering in any manner whatever in the 
affairs of the Netherlands, or of guaranteeing any particular form of 
Government in that country. If, then, there were no duties imposed by 
treaties, he thought that no consideration of interest or of expediency could 
possibly arise which would justify or induce this country to adopt any 
other course than that of total abstinence from all interference.’48  
Earl Grey agreed and came to the conclusion that ‘If we are not so bound, I repeat, my Lords, 
with my noble friend, that, in my opinion, sound policy, justice, and respect for the 
independence of other people, as well as regard for the interest of this country, enjoin us on 
the present occasion not to interfere with the internal affairs of Belgium.’49 Foreign minister 
Aberdeen replied that either way ‘the interests of this country were at all times so intimately 
connected with those of the Netherlands, that it was impossible for the Government to look 
with indifference at the situation in which they were placed.’50 To which some Tories, 
including the Duke of Wellington’s son, believed that in order to prevent that which was 
already bad from becoming worse, a system of complete non-intervention had to be 
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imposed.51 
 Future Lord Chancellor and Whig Henry Brougham (r. 1830-1834) condemned the 
principle of interference and was convinced that the principle would drag England into war: 
 ‘I know no way in which these blessings [of peace] may be more securely 
preserved—there is nothing, I take it, more clear, more indisputable, more 
unquestionable, than that a firm resolution—not to interfere with others is 
the best way to preserve peace; and nothing is more certain, in the 
circumstances of the country, to encourage war, nothing could more tend 
to destroy that peace, than to involve the country in foreign interference 
with neighbouring States. I know of no danger which can render hostilities 
more certain, and none more liable to bring them home to us—nothing 
more liable to make widespread war abroad crush and overwhelm us, than 
for us to adopt those principles of the Holy Alliance which are contained 
and embodied in the King's Speech.’52  
He pointed out to the House that the principle could be reversed against the interests of 
Britain. As an example he referred to the unrest in Ireland as he sketched the scenario in 
which the Dutch King considers British governance in Ireland tyrannical and he 
subsequently intermeddles between the English and Irish.53 The Lord Chancellor’s 
standpoint was taken by Radical Hume a year later and used against the then Lord 
Chancellor’s government: ‘Holland or Belgium, or any of the continental Powers, had as 
much right to dictate the terms upon which a separation should take place between England 
and Ireland, as this country had to interfere in the dispute between Belgium and Holland.’54  
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 As the new administration defended their devotion to the principle of non-interference, 
Radicals referred to the Concert’s interference in the fixing of the limits and the selection of 
the future king for Belgium as proof that the English government was governing the 
independent Belgian state.55 The selection of a sovereign to rule the new Belgian state was a 
controversial affair among the five powers united in the Concert.56 In Parliament the point in 
question became strongly related to the discussion on the principle of non-interference: ‘If 
foreign powers arrogated to themselves to choose or exclude particular individuals from the 
sovereignty of a State, what became of that undoubted power which the noble Earl 
contended was inherent in any nation to choose its own government.’57 Eventually, the 
decision to install Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg (r. 1831-1865) was much to everyone’s 
satisfaction because he was closely connected to Britain through his marriage to Princess 
Charlotte Augusta of Wales (1796-1817), once heiress to the British throne. Due to 
Leopold’s closeness with Britain he proved to be the ultimate candidate for the Belgian 
throne to the political parties as  
‘that individual, by his long residence here, had received lessons of 
tolerance, and had probably acquired a prudent and temperate, but, at the 
same time, energetic mode of meeting occasional violence, which would 
render him a most valuable Sovereign for Belgium, and he thought from the 
connection of that noble person with this country…that he was remarkably 
well qualified for the office. With such a Sovereign he had no doubt that 
Belgium would take her rank among the scale of European nations, 
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guarding with jealousy their common privileges which she was called upon 
to share.’58 
However, notwithstanding Prince Leopold’s competences, the selection of a Belgian 
sovereign remained a controversial issue. Foreign Minister Lord Palmerston maintained that 
his government did not interfere with Belgium’s domestic affairs because the external 
boundary of a state was not a state’s internal concern. Besides, he considered that for the 
reason that Belgium had never before been an independent state and since its union with the 
Netherlands was arranged for the purpose of contributing to the peace and security of 
Europe, the powers had every right to concern themselves with those circumstances in which 
their own interests, as well as those of Belgium and the Netherlands, were involved.59 In 
regard to the government’s involvement in the selection of the future king Palmerston 
believed that ‘any country in such a case had a right, by the law of nations and of justice, to 
interfere so far as to prevent any Sovereign being elected, or at least to say, that they would 
not acknowledge any one, whose election would necessarily produce war with any other 
Power.’60  Lord Althorp, the Chancellor of the Exchequer and Leader of the House of 
Commons (r. Nov. 1830-1834), insisted that ‘the object of the Government had been to do 
everything in its power to preserve the peace of Europe (because, if the peace of Europe 
were broken the peace of this country must be hazarded)’.61  
 Lord Grey’s ministry received some praise for its efforts and its sense of duty from 
certain Tories, particularly those who had been members of the Wellington Ministry. They 
trusted that the government was solely guided by the permanent interest of Britain as they 
were aware that Belgium’s situation ‘to be pregnant with danger’ to British interests.62 But 	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some Tories also felt that the peace that the government was so anxious to keep ‘might be 
too dearly purchased, and, assuredly, it would be too dearly purchased, if to preserve it, our 
honour was compromised….the conduct which had been adopted in the case which he was 
about to notice did compromise the honour of this country, and was likely most seriously to 
affect its interests.’63 
 The king’s speech on the opening of the session in June 1831 was more carefully 
construed on the issue of interference. The government added an extra condition to the 
applicability of the principle: ‘under the sole condition, sanctioned by the practice of 
nations, and founded on the principles of public law, that in the exercise of that undoubted 
right the security of neighbouring States should not be endangered.’64 Despite 
acknowledging that the condition was an old argument used by despotic powers to justify 
interference in the domestic affairs of other nations, the Tories welcomed the extra 
condition.65 Former Foreign Minister Aberdeen proclaimed: 
‘Now, in that principle he expressed his entire concurrence, but he was 
compelled to add, that no State in Europe, however arbitrary and despotic, need 
fear any obstacle being opposed to its views by the adoption of the principle of 
non-interference so explained and so limited. No State ever threatened to 
interfere in the internal affairs of another country without pretending 
apprehension for the security of itself, or of the neighbouring States. Those 
despotic Powers who interfered in the domestic affaire of other nations did no 
more than the parties to the Conferences at London had done—namely, 
constitute themselves the sole judges of the degree of danger which affected the 
security of other States. The truth was, that this principle of non-interference was 	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of a very elastic nature, and had already received from the plenipotentiaries at 
London a very great latitude of interpretation.’66 
He felt alarmed by the developments as the principle was given a very accommodating 
nature by the powers as  
‘he could not help entertaining serious apprehensions of what might be the 
result of these Conferences upon the interest and welfare of this country… 
He must say, that looking at what had passed, he could not help 
entertaining the most serious apprehensions for the result, particularly as to 
the effects on our future relations with foreign States, and even for the 
preservation of peace itself.’67 
The prime minister, Earl Grey, justified the king’s speech because he believed that the 
principle was subject to exception for a higher purpose and that in the Belgian case there 
was no choice left for Britain for she was impelled to adopt the course  
‘in conformity with the first law of nature, that of self-preservation. She 
was, therefore, bound to interfere.’68  
Wellington changed his tone towards the government’s policies as he asserted ‘that the 
arbitration was most tyrannical, for the parties were never called on to hear the reasons of 
the sentence which was passed on them, nor had they any opportunity of making their 
defence until the sentence had been pronounced to be irrevocable.’69 
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 2.4 Collaboration with France 
In order to avoid the continental countries from ganging up against Britain, and to continue 
to exercise political control on the European continent, Britain occasionally engaged in an 
informal or formal alliance with France. An entente would prevent France from gaining 
strategic benefits over Britain while at the same time acting as a check against Russian 
threats.70 But Belgium grew out to become a Catholic, French-speaking, politically divided 
state that was considered to be an easy target for the French.71 Before becoming prime 
minister Grey felt that mediation could only be conducted in a proper manner if it were done 
‘in concert with France, so as to effect a new and amicable settlement of the country.’72 
According to the prime minister, Wellington, England could not attempt to pacify the 
Netherlands and Belgium alone as all five signatories of the Treaty of Vienna ‘would claim 
their indisputable right to give their opinion upon the future explanation of the articles.’73 
The same maxim applied to France, ‘nor could any other Power use an effort to pacify or 
reconcile existing differences alone; the object must be attempted by all the parties in 
concert, and that concert, whatever the arrangements were, must include France.’74 
 Wellington and Grey’s statements did not prevent the general suspicion in Parliament 
towards France from growing. The distrust towards France peaked after French troops 
entered the southern provinces to meet King William’s forces in August 1831. Conservative 
parliamentarians even believed that France was using Belgium to destabilise Britain. The 
Tories believed England’s honour and stability was endangered as the ruling French party 
was deliberately driving France into a war with England as ‘every thing was done to revive 
old grievances and old prepossessions against the English nation.’75 Since the Tories 	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considered France a growing threat to Britain, they implored that Britain had to ‘for the 
honour of England, for the safety of the country, and for the peace of Europe, to make a firm, 
and a bold, and a determined resistance to the line of policy which that party [revolutionary 
party] in France would wish to pursue.’76 The Marquis of Londonderry feared that it was 
already too late as he witnessed that ‘the time has arrived…when France takes the initiative 
in settling the affairs of Europe.’77 He considered the French ambassador in London, Prince 
Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand (1754-1838), the biggest threat to England:  
‘I tremble for the position in which this country is placed. I see nothing 
offered in the way of explanation by the representative of the four Powers, 
- I see no remonstrance from England ; but I see France overawing us all 
by the aid of her skilful and active politician here, and I fear that he has in 
his hands the power of decision, and exerts that, which I shall call a 
domineering influence, over such of political arrangements of Europe as 
are carried on and decided upon in this country, which formerly were 
always directed by the wisdom and genius of England.’78  
He even went so far as to allege that the English ministers were consorting with Talleyrand: 
‘… this individual was constantly near the King's closet, that despatches 
were shewn to him in that quarter before they reached the public, and that 
his Majesty's Ministers went one after another to him, appearing to consult, 
invite, and to wait for his decision, he, as an Englishman, heard of such 
proceedings with some degree of disgust.’79  
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The Tories were met with enmity and ministers accused them of plunging England 
needlessly into a war with France and getting it involved in one common hostile Europe.80 
The Lord Chancellor argued: 
‘I solemnly and in my conscience believe, that the breaking the peace of 
Europe will, over England, Ireland, and Scotland, be the most hated act 
that any Government could be guilty of; that it would draw down universal, 
loud, and unsparing execrations on the Government; and I do in my 
conscience believe, that those execrations would not be more loud, 
universal, and unsparing, than, according to the soundest view of the 
interests of this country, and the honour of the Crown which I serve, and 
which I think I more faithfully serve the more I give utterance to these 
opinions, they would be merited by the advisers of so insane and criminal 
a course.’81 
In particular the Marquis of Londonderry fell victim to these accusations and he denied that 
he intended war. He believed that embracing France would make  
‘all the concessions made by this country—all the efforts made to preserve 
peace—the abandonment, of our allies, and our acquiescence in their 
degradation—the robbery of the Portuguese fleet—the demolition of the 
fortresses—the occupation of Belgium—the Belgian army's being 
officered by French officers, would then all go for nothing.’82  
With Londonderry many Tories believed that history had proven that France was Britain’s 
natural rival and enemy, and that the Dutch had been an ancient ally:  
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‘Not to keep you in suspense as to precedents, your Lordships must 
recollect that remarkable instance to-wards the close of the 17th century, 
when Parliament, in a situation not dissimilar from the present, attempted, 
in the reign of Charles 2nd, to detach that Monarch from his unnatural 
connexion with France, and recommended to him in lieu thereof to form 
an alliance more creditable to his character and to the honour and interest 
of the country, by cultivating a closer and more cordial intimacy with the 
Dutch nation. A similar course had been pursued by Parliament on other 
occasions.’83  
Grey dismissed the words of Tories by reminding them that the world had changed: 
‘we had not to treat with old-established governments, but with two new 
governments, emanating from two Revolutions. In candour I must state, 
that I found France influenced by sound views and just principles of policy. 
The French government is entitled to the more credit for moderation, since 
it has been continually assailed and goaded on by a furious party aiming at 
nothing but war.’84 
But France’s action over the months resulted in an increased sense of apprehension towards 
its growing influence in Europe.85 Many parliamentarians feared for British honour and 
interests, as the country grew closer to France.86 They feared that ‘ancient allies and foreign 
governments in general’ denounced the ‘new order of things.’87 The arguments were 
repudiated by Grey by repeating ‘that the first object of an English Minister was the careful 
guardianship of the hopes and interests of England, and in repeating that sentiment then, he 	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would add, that it was on it he based the necessity of a close union between France and this 
country.’88 The Radicals supported the Grey government on this point, as they believed  
‘that nothing could be more for the peace of Europe than the continuance 
of a close alliance between the two countries. France was our nearest 
neighbour, and our richest neighbour—it was the richest country in Europe; 
and the more intercourse we had with it, the more it would be for the 
benefit both of France and of England.’89 
 2.5 Collaboration with the Holy Alliance 
The Tories were not supporters of the act of revolution but they were aware of the imminent 
threat of the intensification and spread of revolts outside of France and Belgium. Regardless 
of their antipathy towards revolution, many Tories were satisfied to witness revolts in 
countries ceded by the Holy Alliance to different sovereigns. These countries ‘had been 
prevented by the power of the sword from giving expression to the feelings which animated 
them’ and this was a bigger evil than revolution.90  
 During the Wellington Ministry the Whigs and Radicals condemned British collaboration 
with the Holy Alliance. Parliamentarians believed that the government was interfering with 
the internal affairs of Belgium, and they tended to associate the British government with the 
Holy Alliance:  
‘Would it not say, it a following-up of the system of the Holy Alliance, 
which our present ministers, when out of office, had condemned? What! 
The people of England— the friends of freedom,—they who made choice 
of a Sovereign for themselves—they who would let none interfere with 
their choice,—they who maintained their choice —ought a Minister of 	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England to join with despots to force on a free people the king that should 
rule them?’91  
The parliamentarians considered British policy similar to the Holy Alliance’s method of 
dealing with unrest: ‘that we, like the Holy Alliance, will take upon ourselves, in the first 
place, the police of the Netherlands; and in the next place, like that famous Alliance, the 
police of the rest of Europe.’92 The Earl Grey despised the way in which Britain had traded 
the principle of the balance of Europe,  
‘which would protect the weak against the strong,’ for alliances built on 
‘principles of confiscation and division, in accordance with which we have 
transferred one kingdom to another, without regard to the sentiments or to 
the interests of those who were transferred. From the first moment, those 
transfers have never allowed to Europe an hour’s security.’93  
Radical Hume regretted  
‘to see, that the members of Government, who had always declared 
themselves hostile to the principles of the Holy Alliance, should now turn 
round and act in accordance with those principles, by an interference with 
Belgium, which neither of the parties affected by that interference thanked 
them for…The Belgians protested, and the Dutch protested, against the 
interference of this country, and, by that interference, he contended that 
this country had, in fact, become a member of the Holy Alliance, and was 
supporting its principles.’94 
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Aberdeen had a different approach as he considered Britain’s conduct towards the 
Netherlands, even worse than the Holy Alliance’s intermeddling with other states: 
‘I say, give me the Holy Alliance in preference to an Alliance which 
justifies its conduct towards a friendly power by such an evasion. I do not 
wish to extend the comparison further; but so far as the declaration at Aix-
la-Chapelle, and the manner in which the claim of the king of Holland 
under that declaration has been treated, I say, that the Holy Alliance 
appears to great advantage—for, although they might condemn, they did 
hear.’95 
With the terms of settlement of the Conference of London on the table in October 1831, but 
still unknown to Parliament, former Foreign Secretary Aberdeen once again emphasised that 
the Dutch cause was the cause of England too. He expressed his regret that the Dutch 
government received support from Russia and Prussia by their reluctance to accept anything 
harmful to Holland’s rights:  
‘I regret to see the Emperor of Russia the protector of Holland. I regret to 
see him occupy the place which I had hoped belonged to England.’96  
Grey defended his government’s policies for they were not to blame for the separation of the 
Dutch kingdom, neither for the existence and functioning of the Concert. Moreover, he 
regarded the attacks as unfair as he had found Britain involved ‘in all the difficulties into 
which my predecessors had brought it’ on coming into office.97 Above all, Grey contended 
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that his object for the negotiations was to obtain a security against war, ‘whilst he 
endeavoured to preserve the honour of this country, and of all the countries concerned.’98  
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Chapter 3 – Order and Revolution 
The Belgian Revolution caught British society and its politicians off guard. The events on 
the continent excited Britain, but it also made some English feel alarmed. Particularly 
conservative politicians felt worried that the unrest would cross the channel and instigate 
controversial issues at home. Overall, British politicians felt concern for order in British 
society. The sudden outbreak, to the British, of civil unrest in the Netherlands, made British 
parliamentarians apprehensive to motions on parliamentary reform, on repeal of the union 
with Ireland and it led to general debates on the legitimacy of means of revolution. Some 
parties used the example of the Belgian Revolt to plainly show how disruptive revolution is 
to a society, while others applauded the power of revolution. Patriotic language went back 
and forth across the benches in Parliament as parties accused the other of using the Belgian 
example to either elicit or prevent reform. From the opening of the session in November 
1830 at least until 1834, the Belgian question became an integral part of parliamentary 
debates and it was used in the patriotic language of parliamentarians to support arguments 
on domestic issues. This chapter will try to show how the Belgian question influenced these 
debates, and how it led to discussions on matters that were politically and ideologically 
sensitive.          
 3.1 Order in Britain 
The bulk of the English electorate held moderate views in 1830. They acknowledged the 
imperfect character of the British constitution and the majority hoped for reform, but few 
could see similarities between the French political situation and the English.1 Nonetheless, 
the government felt concern for domestic law and order, especially in the northern industrial 
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districts in the months following the July and Belgian Revolts.2 Home Secretary Peel noted 
in October 1830 that  
‘The success of the Mobs and either the unwillingness or inability of the 
soldiers to cope with them in Paris and Brussels, is producing natural 
effects in the Manufacturing districts here, calling into action the almost 
forgotten Radicals of 1817 and 1819, and provoking a discussion upon the 
probable results of insurrectionary movements in this country.”3  
Already upon the opening of the session on 2 November 1830 in response to the king’s 
speech, patriotic language was used by a Tory to emphasise the greatness of Britain in 
comparison to the continent. He was convinced that the discontent and the disorder that had 
manifested in various parts of Europe were proof ‘of the high character which this great and 
happy country had acquired in the civilized world.’4 Many conservative parliamentarians 
made similar comparisons and took it a step further by also emphasising that despite the rule 
of disharmony around it, Britain remained at peace and on a good footing with the world at 
large: ‘Through the storm which agitated society throughout Europe, and endangered the 
existing institutions of all the States over which it rolled, our ship still rode triumphant’.5 
The Tories celebrated that the English people enjoyed uninterrupted prosperity under their 
‘excellent’ constitution for over one-hundred-and-forty years. England ‘was the great birth-
place of rational liberty’ and continued to protect the liberties of the people.’6 Only in 
England there existed the greatest perfection of alliance of social order with good 
government, in which  
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‘the laws and the religion of this country formed its security and its 
safeguard….While other nations groaned under the yoke of tyranny and 
oppression, and while the people of other countries either suffered without 
relief or subverted their Government and institutions, the Constitution of 
England had remained untouched and unaffected, like that sacred chain of 
nature which binds the jarring elements in peace.’7 
Notwithstanding the laudation of England’s greatness, some Tories were worried about the 
state of the country as they experienced ‘a distress, indeed, so deep and extensive, that 
unless means were taken to mitigate it, the most serious and alarming consequences might 
ensue.’8 The conservative Marquis of Londonderry feared for domestic tranquility and he 
deemed it the duty of the House and the aristocracy, especially the noble lords of the Whig 
party, to stand by the Throne and the executive so that subversive influences could be 
silenced.9 He felt that some members of the British aristocracy failed England by supporting 
and interfering with revolutions abroad. He perceived major inconsistencies in the foreign 
policy of the Grey Ministry and he feared it would bring down Britain.10 
 3.2 Revolution 
Both the July and the Belgian Revolution had a significant impact on British politics and 
society. There is no doubt that the July revolution aroused great interest, but the question is 
whether the British public were prepared to draw analogies between the contemporary 
situation in France and in Britain. According to historian Norman Gash (1912-2009) some 
British definitely were and most of them belonged to the extreme wings of English politics, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Dundas, HPD3 1:59, 60, 2 Nov. 1830 
8 Lloyd Kenyon, HPD3 1:214, 5 Nov. 1830 
9 Londonderry, HPD3 1:248, 8 Nov. 1830. 
10 Londonderry, HPD3 5:27, 9 Aug. 1831. 
	   41	  
namely the ultra-Radicals and the ultra-Tories.11 Shortly after the July Revolution, British 
politicians used liberal successes in France to urge all English reformers to unite at what 
they considered were favourable times for the reform movement at home.12 Englishmen 
were united in their support for the second French Revolution but not many were inspired to 
see the French as an example for their own political behaviour.13 Radical Hume thought too 
highly of Britain to believe that a French analogy would take place he hoped that the people 
of England would be as apprehensive of their rights as the French.14  
 The Tory party was split on the legitimacy of the means of revolution. Some Tories 
regarded the July Revolution in a more positive light than the Belgian one. The Wellington 
Ministry was often attacked by the high-Tories for their support of the French 
revolutionaries. At the time, the British government had lost no time in recognising Louise 
Philippe. Wellington acknowledged that by recognising the new French king they had 
approved the principle of revolution. However, they had done so to preserve ‘the friendly 
understanding between the two countries entire.’15 Being a liberal Tory, Wellington was 
often criticised by fellow Tories as he supported the means of revolution. To try and 
convince his peers Wellington, and fellow liberal Tories, often made references and 
comparisons to England’s Glorious Revolution in 1688. Wellington ‘was not sorry that 
Charles 10th had been driven from the Throne of France, as James 2nd had been from the 
Throne of England, for attempting to subvert the institutions and liberties of his country…’16 
Ultra-Tories considered the comparisons out of place: ‘He trusted, that even the noble Lord 
himself would hardly say that the present case and that of Charles 2nd were parallel, so far 
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as the reasons of the course pursued in the two cases were concerned.’17 Former Home 
Secretary Peel tried to bring nuance in the liberal Tory stand as he called resistance on the 
continent justifiable notwithstanding that revolution led those engaged in irremediable ruin, 
especially the working classes.18  
 The ultra-Tories made use of the July Revolution. They were preoccupied with what they 
assumed were the dangers of Catholicism. Besides their admiration of the anticlerical 
character of the French Revolution, they felt deeply dissatisfied with the Wellington 
government. The ultra-Tories did not convince many others among the general conservative 
population, perhaps because many saw their propaganda as a continuation of their hostility 
towards Wellington that had begun with the government’s decision to impose Catholic 
emancipation in 1829.19 Richard Vyvyan, an English landowner and an ultra-Tory, led the 
anti-Wellington campaign and he argued that the Catholic emancipation was a component in 
the larger struggle on the continent between liberalism and representative government on 
one side, and tyranny and despotism on the other.20  
 The Whigs on the other hand, joined the liberal Tories in making comparisons to 
England’s own revolution. Despite referring to revolutions as ‘evils in themselves’, Grey 
considered revolution a justified and necessary, even a noble principle, in the event that the 
liberties of a people were attacked. This applied particularly to the case of the Glorious and 
the July Revolution and Grey appraised the purity of patriotism in these acts of revolution.21 
The Marquis of Londonderry denounced the glorification of the July Revolution by the 
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Whigs. He could not understand how English noble lords could glorify the continued spill of 
blood on the European mainland.22 
 The Radicals applauded the European revolutions. They felt that the French had finally 
obtained what England had secured a century and an half earlier, namely a free press and a 
representative government.23 Radicals attacked the Tories for not supporting the Belgians ‘a 
great people rising in their strength, and wrestling their liberties from the unwilling hands of 
their despots…’24 They wondered how England could be considered a country of liberty 
when parliamentarians regretted such occurrences.25 However, the analogy was 
subsequently used by the Tories to contradict the Radical’s demand for a similar change in 
England because why should Englishmen start “mimicking those who are imitating us?”26 
As Hume claimed that British bayonets forced the Bourbons from the throne so that a 
constitution and chartered rights could be imposed, he was compelled to hear the king and 
Parliament regretting that tyranny had been overcome and that liberty was restored in France. 
Hume explained that these institutions saw their own practices, privileges and monopolies 
endangered by the revolutions, ‘Such men might, and did, condemn the proceedings of the 
French, but honest Englishmen did not.’27  
 The British had not expected an outbreak of upheavals in the southern provinces of the 
Netherlands because they were largely unaware of the extent of discontentment over King 
William’s despotic government and authoritarian policies concerning religion, commerce 
and language. Before the outbreak of the revolution, British politicians considered King 
William a good and moderate king and they associated his country with constitutionalism 
and political freedom. They believed the histories and fates of the two countries to be firmly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Londonderry, HPD3 1:248, 8 Nov. 1830. 
23 Gash, ‘English Reform and French Revolution in the General Election of 1830’, 266. 
24 Hume, HPD3 1:79, 2 Nov. 1830. 
25 Hume, HPD3 1:79, 2 Nov. 1830. 
26 Leeds Mercury (21 August 1830), Norman Gash, ‘English Reform and French Revolution’, 266. 
27 Hume, HPD3 1:80-1, 2 Nov. 1830. 
	   44	  
intertwined.28 The initial British reaction to the Belgian revolt was also divided along party 
lines. According to historian Pieter François contemporary periodicals show how 
fundamentally opposed the Whig and Tory attitudes were. The periodicals that supported the 
Grey government considered the Belgians a misunderstood people and their revolution 
deserved British support and sympathy. They regarded the Treaty of Vienna a foolish Tory 
mistake. Especially because it was evident from the outset that it would be impossible to 
create a viable union between people with different religions, languages, histories and 
perhaps even divergent national identities. The Whig periodicals blamed the Wellington 
government for spreading negative responses and thus influencing public opinion on the 
Belgian Revolt in the first weeks after its outbreak.29 Both the Radicals and the Whigs had to 
face accusations in Parliament for trying to provoke unrest in Britain through their 
promotion and support of the Belgian Revolt. The Whigs were described by an ultra-Tory as 
 ‘that revolutionary party who had been at work for years, and who sought 
to produce the same confusion in this country which those who were 
actuated by an equal spirit had already effected in France and Belgium, 
and would gladly spread from one part of Europe to the other.’30  
These accusations were especially strong in debates concerning parliamentary reform and 
the question of the repeal of the union. The Tory periodicals considered the Belgians as an 
ungrateful people who rebelled against their legitimate monarch. They deemed the Belgian 
Revolution not a proper revolution on its own. It was a group of ignorant people who were 
lured into revolution by French conspirators less than a month after the July Revolution.31 
Some Tories argued that while the French resisted arbitrary authority, the Belgian 
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Revolution was an unjust and unprovoked rebellion.32  
 The Wellington government considered the Belgian uprising a threat to the European 
balance of power, and it supported Britain’s long-time ally King William.33 The Whigs on 
the other hand, immediately approved of the efforts and demands of the Belgian 
revolutionaries. The Radicals supported the cause of the Belgian revolutionaries even more 
fervently than the Whigs. The Grey government soon realised that creating an independent 
Belgium and keeping it from falling into French hands would prove a challenge, but 
defending this policy in Parliament would prove their biggest challenge. 34  
 3.3 Parliamentary reform 
Parliamentary reform became an important issue in Parliament since the fall of the 
Wellington Ministry and as the public’s attitude towards reform was considerably influenced 
by the revolutions in France and Belgium.35 The Duke of Wellington attributed his 
parliamentary defeat in November 1830 to the excitement: “The administration was beaten 
by two events. First, the Roman Catholic question; next, the French revolution.”36 The 
Wellington Ministry abruptly resigned in November on an issue that they would rather 
evade and give the responsibility to address it to their successors. The issue of parliamentary 
reform became inescapable for the Grey government.37 Further division was provoked by 
the question whether the overpowering demand for reform was the culmination of a deep 
domestic agitation, or the result of the English election coinciding with a revolution in 
France.38  
 The Whigs believed that the demand for reform was a ‘deep-rooted feeling’ that was not 
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engendered by the events in France and Belgium.39 But the Whigs did feel that the July and 
Belgian Revolutions had made debate on reform possible because ‘by at once removing 
those fears which had been so long and deeply impressed in the minds of all classes in this 
country as to the danger of Reform.’40 People in support of reform were mostly members of 
the middle and the lower classes as they expected the reform of the representative system 
would increase their influence on parliamentary decisions.41 The Radicals refined the Whigs’ 
assertion and attacked opponents of parliamentary reform. They accused the Tories of 
putting the country in danger as they repudiated resistance in Europe against 
‘unconstitutional encroachments on the rights and liberties of the people…’42 Radicals felt 
that by doing this, feelings of anarchy and disappointment, which the Tories described as 
prevailing on the continent, would create civil unrest in Britain if the Tories did not abstain 
from opposition ‘to a measure of which the whole people of England approved, and in return 
for the success of which they would have given their lasting gratitude and affection.’43 The 
Radicals ascribed the Grey government a responsibility to push for reform ‘for Europe was 
looking to England, and if the latter submitted to a military Government, the hopes of 
freedom in France, Belgium, and other countries, would be materially depressed.’44	  Tory 
John Croker (1767-1845), principal contributor to the ultra-Tory Quarterly Review, agreed 
with the Radicals’ standpoint that the government had a responsibility towards the continent. 
However, he considered it in a different light: 
‘hitherto England had been the sheet-anchor of rational liberty and 
constitutional monarchy—now it was about to assume a different character: 
heretofore we had protected those principles both at home and abroad—	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now we were abandoning them everywhere…by a similar impulse, but in a 
different direction, would this Bill produce a re-action here and elsewhere, 
by giving undue encouragement to the democratic spirit. And to say 
nothing of the direct and immediate changes to be produced by the 
measure at home, could we, if democracy prevailed elsewhere, be sure of 
retaining our monarchy, our aristocracy, and all the other institutions under 
which this nation had so long prospered, and of which she had so long 
been proud?45 
The political parties were not only split on the issue amongst each other, they were also 
internally divided. For example, Whig parliamentarian Lord Darlington (1788-1864) was 
ready to admit that the current system was not perfect ‘but the country had, for a period of 
more than 150 years, enjoyed a degree of prosperity, under existing institutions, which was 
unparalleled at any antecedent period.’46 Darlington had the support of Tory politicians, like 
Sir Robert Peel whose words on the subject were imbued with patriotic sentiment:  
‘I ask them to look back upon a period of 150 years—to bear in mind that 
their Constitution, in its present form, has so long endured,—and I ask 
them where, among the communities of Europe, do you find institutions 
which have afforded the same means of happiness, and the same security 
for liberty? I conjure them to bear in mind the result of every attempt that 
has hitherto been made to imitate our own institutions. In France, in Spain, 
in Portugal, in Belgium, the utmost efforts have been exhausted to 
establish a form of government like ours, —to adjust the nice balance 
between the conflicting elements of royal, aristocratical, and popular 
power—to secure the inestimable blessings of limited monarchy and 	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temperate freedom. If power can be so safely intrusted to the people—if 
they are so competent to govern themselves—such enlightened judges of 
their own interests, why has it happened that, up to this hour, every 
experiment to establish and regulate popular control over executive 
government has, with one single exception, failed?’47 
The Tories also agreed with Darlington’s arguments because they felt that the times were too 
turbulent for domestic reform.48 Especially with all the ‘experimental governments afloat’ in 
Europe: ‘When all Europe was in a state of insurrection and distraction, was it for us to go to 
sea under the flag of the new Admiral of England, to try an experimental cruise in quest of a 
new Constitution?’49 Earl Grey also used the discussion on the settlement of the Belgian 
question to assert the proper policy towards reform. He was of the opinion that in the current 
dangers of time the government should not find recourse in arms, but defend itself  
‘by securing the affections of your fellow-subjects, and by redressing their 
grievances, and—my Lords, I will pronounce the word—by reforming 
Parliament. Through my whole life I have advocated Reform, and I have 
thought that, if it were not attended to in time, the people would lose all 
confidence in Parliament, and we must make up our minds to witness the 
destruction of the Constitution.’50 
Whig politicians tried to stress that parliamentary reform would be constructed on the 
‘ancient days of the Constitution of this country’, and that the object was not ‘revolution but 
restoration – to restore the representation to that state in which it ought to be, not change it 
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from what it had been – to repair, not to pull down.’51 The Tories tried to link the way the 
government dealt with the Belgian question, to the way the government should handle the 
issue of parliamentary reform.52 Tory politicians linked the current misery of the lower 
classes in Belgium and France, the people who called for revolution, to the fate of the lower 
classes if the constitution was changed. They were convinced that the English lower classes, 
who demanded reform, would be the first to suffer ‘and they, therefore, must be weaned 
from these errors, by the more intelligent classes.’53 Former Whig but now ardent Tory Lord 
Wynford (1767-1845) contemplated on the effects of the sudden changes in the form of 
governments in France and Belgium, and he concluded that it was thought better ‘to 
preserve the ancient forms of Government… From France let them travel to Belgium, and 
then ask the poor man if he could wish for Reform when Reform was followed by such 
disastrous changes?’54  
 3.4 Ireland 
Discussion in Parliament concerning Ireland was also linked to the example of Belgium in 
order to reinforce arguments. Most supporters of repeal could not understand how 
antagonists  
‘…forget what had taken place in different parts of Europe since that time? 
France had been revolutionized—Belgium had been revolutionized—
England had been reformed. Why then was Ireland to remain quiet under 
the burthen of her numerous grievances, which all allowed to exist, and to 
some of which his Majesty's Ministers said they would apply remedies?’55 
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Another example is the introduction of a proposition by an Irish Whig who proposed 
changes in order to make the system more conformable to the wishes of the Irish people. He 
supported his argument by comparing the Irish situation to the Belgian. In Belgium, culture 
was also in shackles with resistance and revolution by the people as a result, ‘which an 
enlightened Government ought surely to have foreseen’.56 Another Whig felt that the cuts on 
the defence budget threatened the successful protection of the country as  ‘…the question 
now was, not whether we were to abstain from interference with others, but whether others 
were not likely to interfere with us. Had not the case of Holland and Belgium been instanced 
as similar to that of England and Ireland?’57  
 The language of patriotism was especially strong with leader of the Radicals, and 
Irishman, Daniel O’Connell (1775-1847) who rejoiced the success of the Belgians, as he 
believed that they had lived in a state of slavery. O’Connell believed that ‘excepting the 
Union of Great Britain with Ireland, there is a fouler blot in the page of history than the 
annexation of Belgium to Holland.’58 He definitely did not want the Irish to hold the same 
fate as the Belgians but he shared with the House his opinion that he felt he  
 ‘had a difficult task to perform, for I had to teach Government its duty to 
the people, and I had to teach the people how to obtain its rights from 
Government. I wished to restore Ireland to her proper rank among the 
nations of the earth.’59  
The Whigs found the comparisons out of place. They argued that the Radicals had 
misinterpreted and misapplied the events because the Netherlands and Belgium, unlike 
Britain and Ireland, were ‘totally different countries; and they were forcibly united by the 
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Ministers and men of the Holy Alliance, and nothing but force kept them together.’60 
  Some conservative politicians acknowledged that English society was not perfect. 
However, the imperfections were due to the people: ‘Disorders, it was true, there had been, 
and attempts, he knew, were not wanting to excite discontent and dissatisfaction; but they 
arose not from any defect in that Constitution, but from the depravity of human nature… He 
was convinced…among the intelligent and enlightened portion of the people of this country, 
a bond of union which was unknown to others; and having that bond of union’61 Peel tried to 
appeal to the aristocracy by asserting  
‘that great changes in any government could not take place without 
exciting alarm and despondency, and without materially and injuriously 
influencing property in the country in which the Revolution took place. He 
called on the House—he called on all people of property—to be fully 
aware of the mistake they would be committing, in dividing this country 
and Ireland, and to be aware of the irreparable evils that must result to both 
from such a measure.’62  
But he also trusted that the inhabitants of Dublin would renounce repeal after they had 
questioned whether the Irish had the ‘same justifiable cause of opposition to the 
Government’, and that they would ‘well consider what was the present condition of those 
countries in which Revolutions had taken place, and compare it with the state in which they 
were before the Revolutions had begun.’63 Radical parliamentarian Hume condemned the 
tendencies in Parliament of making ‘unnecessary’ comparisons to Belgium, with the 
intention to create ‘prejudice’ among the government and the House on issues of reform.64 	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He agreed with Peel that the revolutions in France and Belgium led to much misery but he 
was convinced ‘that timely Reform and retrenchment would be the means of preventing 
such a Revolution here.’65  
 The ideological battle among the parties was most openly debated when ultra-Tory 
Vyvyan challenged the intentions of the Radical party for their support of the Belgian 
Revolution. He accused the Radicals of endeavouring to unleash a revolt in Ireland, similar 
to the one in Belgium: 
 ‘An opportunity had long been wanted to expose the machinations of that 
party which had calumniated the king of the Netherlands, and the time had 
at length arrived, to tear the mask off a party that had done, and was doing, 
so much mischief in Europe. The machinations of that party had given rise 
to what had taken place in Belgium, and it was now pretty plain that the 
efforts of the same party were at work, to create a somewhat similar 
explosion in another quarter, with which the hon. member for Kerry 
[Radical O’Connell] might be acquainted, and to which he (Sir Richard 
Vyvyan) should not more particularly allude. That party which associated 
with Liberals, while it professed despotic principles, was the cause of the 
revolution in France. It was in consequence of the system which that party 
carried on in Belgium that the revolt succeeded there, and the same party 
was desirous to provoke a similar resistance elsewhere. Although the 
explosion had first taken place in Belgium, it was intended to extend much 
further. It was indeed time for the Government to look about it. The centre 
of the bigoted army was in Paris; the right wing was at Brussels, while the 
left wing was looking on in Dublin. There was still time left to unmask 	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such a party, and to counteract its efforts. It was an unholy alliance of 
bigotry and despotism which endeavoured to work on the passions of the 
people.’66  
Vyvyan was not the only parliamentarian who was suspicious of other parties’ intentions. A 
Whig also felt  
‘compelled to guess at the intentions and meaning of the repeal advocates, 
some of whom had declared that they wished to see Ireland independent 
like Belgium. But did they forget, that Belgium was described in history as 
the "prize-fighting ground" of Europe; and that if Ireland were to be in the 
same way separated from England, it would, in the same way, become the 
prize-fighting ground of Europe?67 
The Grey government fell under attack as supporters of repeal considered the members of 
the government as acting inconsistent with the principles they held before they came to 
power: 
‘In England they were Reformers—in Ireland coercionist…They adopted 
an anti-union policy abroad. In Belgium they were anti-unionists, while 
they were unionists at home. Abroad they were anti-unionists even to the 
death—they were unionists at home even to the death.’68 
Overall, British politicians considered the Belgian question as an serious international 
crisis in itself that had to be dealt with as soon as possible. But the issue also became a 
convenient ‘political football’ that parties used to carry and justify what they considered 
was the most appropriate British response to domestic issues and manifestations.   	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Conclusion 
The study of parliamentary debates has shown that the Belgian Revolt was a highly debated 
issue in Britain and it should not be overlooked when studying patriotism in nineteenth-
century British politics. Politics of patriotism characterised the ideological struggle between 
the political parties and by November 1830 it was already invigorated by the Belgian 
question. Belgium became an integral component in the ideological struggle between parties 
but it also created a growing division within the parties. The Tories were particularly divided 
and the Whigs had a hard time to remain consistent with their liberal beliefs during the Grey 
Cabinet.   
 The government’s policy in the settlement of the Belgian question lay under close 
scrutiny and it remained a point of discussion in the period 1830-1834. The political parties 
differed on what the appropriate British reaction should be on issues that were closely 
related to Belgium, such as the principle of non-interference and the collaboration with the 
Concert, France and the Holy Alliance. It led to intense ideological disputes on the meaning 
of liberal English values and how they were applied abroad. Negotiations with the Concert 
and particularly the collaboration with the Holy Alliance and France, made parliamentarians 
question the direction of British foreign policy and they feared that English principles were 
not properly looked after. They feared for England’s honour and reputation in international 
politics as France’s influence was increasing. Many felt that the British destiny to enforce 
political freedom, constitutionalism and enlightenment abroad had been compromised by the 
government’s actions during the negotiations with the other great powers.  
 Debates on the appropriate British response were not confined to issues of foreign policy. 
The Belgian question was also used to contest domestic affairs such as parliamentary reform 
and repeal of the union with Ireland. Political parties reflected the manner in which Belgium 
was handled and evaluated, onto the way domestic matters should be approached. With fear 
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for domestic unrest British politicians regularly put fundamental matters such as 
sovereignty, order and the legitimacy of the means of revolution on the table. They wanted 
to avoid creating precedents, based on the government’s actions and statements in the 
Belgian question, which could lead to disturbances in Britain and/or Ireland. As foreign 
policy and domestic affairs became integrated through fundamental themes in British 
politics, all political parties presented themselves as more patriotic than their rivals. 
Consequently, the Belgian question became the battleground on which English intellectual, 
cultural and moral ideas were projected.   
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